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The Dieppe Raid of 19 August left an indelible mark on Canada. 
As the first major offensive against 
Hitler’s Festung Europa, Operation 
Jubilee was a severe military setback. 
Within a few hours, five thousand 
Canadians (over 80 percent of the 
attacking force) suffered losses 
of almost 70 percent. Since that 
fateful day historians have offered 
various explanations of the causes 
and consequences of the disaster. 
For some, the lessons learned 
contributed to the success of the 
Normandy landings in 1944. Others 
have argued Dieppe was nothing 
more than a useless sacrifice. Rarely 
has a military operation so polarized 
opinions and intrigued researchers. 
That said, virtually every study on 
Dieppe focuses on the tactical and 
operational level of the raid.1 Indeed, 
with the exception of the works by 
Brian L. Villa and Peter Henshaw that 
cover the decision-making process, 
most historians have attempted to 
analyze the operation’s weaknesses 
rather than debate its relevance.2 
The way the planners of Jubilee 
publicized the event, even though the 
episode is etched into our memories, 
has interested historians even less.3 
It took Timothy J. Balzer’s close look 
at the communication strategy of 
Combined Operations Headquarters 
to conclude that, overall, the story 
fed to the newspapers had been 
written in advance, regardless of 
the raid’s outcome.4 Just as historian 
Paul Veyne reflected on whether 
the ancient Greeks believed in their 
myth, it is worth asking to what 
extent Canadians were duped by the 
subterfuge. 5 Polling methods during 
the war were largely experimental 
and therefore unreliable which makes 
examining a source as volatile as public 
opinion a challenge.6 Nevertheless, 
it is possible to get an idea of the 
popular mood by examining indirect 
sources such as newspapers. If we 
agree that, in a democratic society, 
the press is the mirror of tensions 
and power struggles, an analysis of 
this complex medium should help 
us better understand the story that 
was “sold” to the public and how 
it was received.7 This article will 
test this hypothesis on a sample of 
Quebec francophone newspapers, 
which is where the manipulation of 
information reached new heights, 
with sometimes astonishing results.8
To Manipulate: 
a Double-Edged Sword
In the summer of 1942, the Canadian press focused on the battles of 
Stalingrad and El Alamein. Except 
for the attacks by German submarines 
in the St. Lawrence River, the 
war remained a vague concept in 
Canada, almost surreal, lived by 
proxy essentially through the media, 
newspapers and radio, or the letters 
sent home by those fighting the 
great crusade. It is in that context 
that Canadians received news of 
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Abstract: As historian Paul Veyne 
wondered whether the ancient Greeks 
believed in their myths, one may wonder 
to what extent Canadians were the 
dupes of propaganda during the Second 
World War, particularly with regards to 
the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942. 
This article attempts to clarify the issue 
by analyzing the way French-Canadian 
newspapers “sold” the news and how 
this communications strategy lead to 
the opposite result to that intended. 
Ironically, by focusing on the heroic 
struggle of the only French-Canadian 
regiment involved in the operation – 
les Fusiliers Mont-Royal – and on its 
casualties, the francophone press in 
Quebec helped shaped the myth that 
French-Canadian troops were the 
principal victims of the disaster.
Résumé : Tout comme l’historien Paul 
Veyne se demandait si les Grecs de 
l’antiquité croyaient à leurs mythes, 
on peut se demander jusqu’à quel 
point les Canadiens furent dupes de la 
propagande durant la Seconde Guerre 
mondiale, notamment quand vint le 
moment de relater le raid de Dieppe, le 
19 août 1942. Cet article tente d’élucider 
la question en analysant la façon 
dont les journaux canadiens-français « 
vendirent » la nouvelle et comment cette 
stratégie de communication aboutit 
au résultat inverse de celui escompté. 
Ironiquement, en mettant l’accent sur le 
combat héroïque de l’unique régiment 
canadien-français – les Fusiliers Mont-
Royal – et sur les pertes francophones, 
la presse francophone québécoise 
contribua à façonner le mythe voulant 
que les troupes canadiennes-françaises 
aient été les principales victimes du 
désastre.
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the Dieppe raid. The first press 
releases confirmed the involvement 
of Canadians. On the home front, 
the war finally became a tangible 
reality, involving soldiers with which 
the population could identify. The 
public relations service of Combined 
Operations Headquarters attempted 
to transform a military fiasco into a 
victory with releases insisting that 
several objectives had been achieved. 
For over two months, it would present 
the Canadian military debut as a 
turning point in the war, a necessary 
sacrifice that would pave the way to 
the great invasion of Europe. From 
these military releases the press 
constructed a narrative that various 
newspapers adapted according to 
their particular perspectives. 
Newspaper accounts evolved 
in three phases: “strategic” (19-20 
August) during which a justification 
of the operation was attempted; 
“heroic” (21 August – 14 September), 
without doubt the most paradoxical 
since the casualty lists were printed 
alongside articles celebrating the 
“exploits” of the soldiers; finally, 
“revelatory” (from 15 September) 
that provided the official account of 
losses and three days later the release 
of an official report on the operation. 
Was this sequence of coverage the 
result of a specific information 
strategy? Following a thorough look 
of the military archives in Ottawa and 
London, historian Timothy J. Balzer 
answered yes to that question. His 
account reveals that, even before the 
raid started, Combined Operations 
Headquarters had decided that the 
operation would be presented as a 
success, no matter its outcome.9 
Because media organizations 
tend to draw from similar sources, 
the three-phase sequence of coverage 
can be found in most Canadian 
publications, and it ended with 
the same level of bitterness from 
coast to coast. Through the media, 
the brutal test of Dieppe tended to 
unify Canadians who, at least in 
the course of a few weeks, came to 
share a common understanding of 
the raid. The bubble burst at the end 
of summer, once the extent of the 
disaster was revealed. 
Surprisingly, the most virulent 
criticisms did not come from French 
This iconic photo of Dieppe, taken by the Germans soon after the end of the fighting, captures the death and destruction suffered 
by Canadians on the beach.
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Canada, even though, as its rejection 
of conscription in the plebiscite of 
1942 demonstrated, it remained 
hostile to any unlimited military 
commitment to the war. Instead, the 
most damning critiques first appeared 
in the Conservative Anglo-Canadian 
press. Operation Jubilee was used to 
further pressure the government on 
the question of overseas conscription 
and attack the Liberals’ management 
of the war, in particular their 
determination not to antagonize 
the French Canadian electorate. 
In this regard, the government’s 
communication strategy, which 
consisted of providing information 
tailored to French Canadians, 
heightened tensions.10 For example, 
the coverage of the raid led to a 
skirmish between the Toronto Star 
(Liberal), which spoke glowingly of 
the French Canadians’ participation, 
and the Globe and Mail (Conservative) 
which took offence that French 
Canadians  rece ived so  much 
attention. The Star subsequently 
misunderstood the Globe and Mail’s 
criticism, which was explained by Le 
Devoir: “the Star forgot that the Globe 
and Mail believes it can tarnish M. 
King’s record by targeting the Star.”11
Unfortunately for the Liberal 
g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  C o m b i n e d 
O p e r a t i o n s  H e a d q u a r t e r s ’ 
i n f o r m a t i o n  s t r a t e g y  m i s s e d 
its target. The gap between the 
triumphant rhetoric and the failure 
of the operation was too wide. The 
Canadian high command would 
later plead for the release of a more 
realistic version, however Vice 
Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chief 
of Combined Operations, vigorously 
objected, with his communication 
services reasserting control over 
the information released by British 
newspapers.12 The British pressures 
were all the more obvious when 
the Canadian Army’s  off ic ial 
historian, C.P. Stacey, planned, 
in mid-September, on publishing 
the army’s first official report on 
the raid. Mountbatten personally 
intervened to water down an honest 
document. This deception discredited 
the Canadian government. Even 
the most moderate critics accused 
the government of concealing its 
responsibility for the fiasco.13
The francophone press drew from 
the same sources as its Anglophone 
counterparts, making use of reports 
from war correspondents and 
official releases, while following 
the directives from the censorship 
authorities.14 As a result, dissenting 
points of view were expressed in 
editorials and in the treatment of 
the news. Nevertheless this criticism 
steadily diminished. From May 1942, 
censorship was reorganized and the 
Department of National Defence 
used the opportunity to control more 
closely the dissemination of military 
information in the written press 
and on radio.15 Moreover, in July 
the government information service 
decided to primarily use newspapers 
to transmit their message. Indeed, 
its new director, Charles Vinning, 
felt that newspapers were more 
efficient than the propaganda posters 
and pamphlets already in wide 
circulation.16 This led to the idea 
to release in the press portraits of 
French Canadian soldiers with whom 
it was assumed the francophone 
public were more likely to identify. 
The Dieppe operation was a golden 
opportunity to promote their valour 
in combat, however, because of 
the outcome of the raid, the result 
proved disappointing. Ironically the 
communication strategy backfired 
and persuaded many French 
Canadians that they had largely been 
sacrificed in this fatal foray. Three 
examples illustrate what became a 
deep-rooted myth in the collective 
memory of French Canada.
In the history of the Stanislas 
College, the two founders of the 
institution, Jeannette and Guy 
Boulizon, write that “the ill-fated 
raid on Dieppe [was to] result in 
over 2000 victims in several hours, 
essentially French Canadians.”17 
During an interview, Jeannette 
Boulizon explained that “the French 
were absolutely shocked [to see] that 
Quebecers were sent to the beaches 
of Dieppe to get killed, while the 
English [Canadians] were taking 
it easy…Senior officers remained 
in England…all the young French 
Canadians, all of them, went to 
their deaths!”18 Also during an 
interview, François-Albert Angers, 
an eminent economist offered a 
similar interpretation: “My reaction 
was that, overall, French Canadians 
had been sacrificed; experiments had 
been conducted with our soldiers, 
by sending them on an impossible 
mission.” 19 A Quebec history 
textbook from the 1980s stated the 
same thing: “French Canadian troops 
suffered a resounding defeat. They 
lost 2753 men, killed, wounded or 
taken prisoner.” 20 How is it possible 
that educated and well-informed 
people could believe such falsehood? 
Could part of the answer be found 
in the media hype surrounding 
Jubilee? This article seeks to test this 
hypothesis by analyzing a sample 
of four significant francophone 
Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chief 
of combined operations, was the overall 
commander of the Dieppe Raid. He 
attempted to control the spin of the raid 
almost as soon as it was over.
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titles, La Presse and La Patrie, two 
mainstream daily newspapers of 
Liberal sympathies, Le Canada, the 
voice of the Liberal Party of Canada, 
and Le Devoir, the voice of the French 
Canadian nationalist elite.
To justify the operation: 
the strategic phase
From the  four  newspapers emerges a common narrative, 
almost mythical, featuring the only 
francophone unit involved, the 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR). The 
stories focused on figures like their 
chaplain, Major Armand Sabourin, 
and their commander, Lieutenant-
Colonel Dollard Ménard, as the 
“heroes of Dieppe.” Their advocates, 
the war correspondents and in 
particular Ross Munro, who gave 
a well-publicized presentation in 
Quebec, were added to this group. 
Despite the FMR’s secondary role 
in the Dieppe Raid, the unit soon 
became the focus of the tragedy in 
Quebec. 
On 19 August 1942, the raid 
on Dieppe made the headlines 
everywhere .  The newspapers 
unanimously hailed a costly, yet 
necessary victory. The official story 
was a virtual reproduction of the 
reports released by Combined 
Operations Headquarters. Within 
a few days, the story of Dieppe 
appeared set in stone. With the 
tragedy barely over, all the key 
elements, as well as the justifications – 
still emphasized by many today – 
grabbed the headlines. Like the 
other dailies, Le Devoir included 
Canadian Press releases announcing 
that Canadian troops had managed 
to land “on all the selected spots” 
and “took the beach by storm” after 
sustaining “a particularly violent 
resistance on their left flank while 
they landed tanks at the centre and 
the right flank quickly reached its 
objective.”21 In an editorial, Georges 
Pelletier moderated such enthusiasm 
by pointing out that the raid was 
nothing more than “test” like so 
many operations before.22 As for 
La Presse, it concluded that Dieppe 
was a complete success, comparing 
the landing to the raid against St. 
Nazaire when the Germans had been 
caught by surprise and sustained 
“very heavy casualties.”23 Turcotte, 
Le Canada’s editorialist, insisted the 
raid was a precursor to a greater 
invasion of continental Europe: “a 
dress rehearsal for the day when 
British forces throw aside Nazi 
fortifications.”24
Apart from the exact toll in human 
life, the sequence of events was made 
public less than 24 hours after the 
end of the operation. The main 
justification for the raid was strategic: 
Dieppe was a “dress rehearsal for the 
launch of a Second Front in Europe.”25 
The operation also resulted from 
operational imperatives: Canadian 
Military Headquarters in London 
insisted on the raid’s “experimental” 
nature, congratulating itself for 
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having acquired “vital experience in 
the employment of troops in large 
numbers in an attack as well as an 
experience in the transport of their 
heavy equipment during combined 
operations.” Finally, the operation 
was part of a comprehensive effort 
to test German defences in raids on 
places such as St. Nazaire, Spitzberg 
and Iceland.26 According to the 
Allies the objectives were partially 
achieved through the destruction 
of a battery of six guns and its 
ammunition magazine, a radio 
station and an anti-aircraft battery. 
Combined Operations used these 
small successes to justify the usage 
of their communications plan written 
before the raid took place. Ironically, 
the same newspapers published 
German communiqués that described 
the operation as a “crushing defeat,” 
an “enterprise planned by amateurs” 
for political rather than military 
gains.27 Contradictions between 
Allied and enemy information added 
to the confusion and helped plant the 
seeds of unease – some Allied sources 
claimed 15,000 troops participated in 
the raid. 
In the immediate aftermath of 
the raid only Gérard Pelletier of Le 
Devoir guessed the participation of 
the FMR and openly questioned the 
fate of French Canadian soldiers: 
“it is believed that among those 
who participated in the raid at 
Dieppe were troops belonging to 
the francophone Montreal regiment 
known as the “Fusiliers Mont-Royal” 
as well as other French Canadian 
units. We must wait for details and 
the lists of wounded and missing 
will allow us to better assess the 
part played by our soldiers in the 
raid on Dieppe.”28 It was not until 
the second phase of coverage, on 21 
August, that the Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
became a part of the story. Of all the 
newspapers, Le Devoir was the most 
alarmed about this news. “There is 
concern that Canadian losses were 
heavy at Dieppe. Here, we wait for 
the lists, especially as they relate to 
the Fusiliers Mont-Royal,” read the 
headline. Such wording suggests 
that the myth of Dieppe, the idea that 
French Canadians had been primarily 
sacrificed during the fighting, began 
to take shape as soon as the raid 
was announced, at least among 
nationalists. Alerted by the reports 
from the war correspondents, Gérard 
Pelletier feared the worst: 
The news already available on Dieppe 
make us anticipate long lists of dead 
and wounded, as well as missing. 
All the correspondents who give an 
account of what happened at Dieppe 
and in the vicinity point out that 
the fighting was intense, the losses 
considerable and, if the victorious 
soldiers returned to England, many 
remained in France or will be sent to 
German prison camps. We should 
have expected that.29 
Other newspapers, 
a l b e i t  m o r e 
enthusiastically,  also 
implied that the FMR 
did all the work, thus 
helping forge the myth 
of the French Canadian 
sacrifice at Dieppe. In 
this regard, Le Canada’s 
headline captures the 
sentiment:
The “Fusiliers Mont-Royal” 
did us proud in Dieppe / 
French Canadians carried 
propaganda pamphlets 
and posters asking the 
French to remain neutral so 
as not to attract retaliation / Heroism 
of a chaplain / Nazis murder their 
French Canadian prisoners and had 
others stripped naked, but could 
not prevent their return with their 
wounded.30 
La Presse saluted on its cover page 
“the excellent conduct of our Fusiliers 
at Dieppe…under intense enemy 
fire.”31 Echoing La Presse, La Patrie 
stressed the “heroism of the Fusiliers 
Mont-Royal and their chaplains at 
Dieppe.”32 
O v e r  t h e  n e x t  t w o  d a y s , 
the dispatches almost  always 
presented the Canadian soldiers 
as “commandos,” with the effect 
of  magnifying their  exploi ts . 
Newspapers, including Le Devoir, did 
not question this metamorphosis from 
simple soldiers into super heroes. 
The first headlines distinguished 
clearly the “English commandos” 
from the “Canadian infantry.” Such 
distinctions soon disappeared from 
the accounts. Instead, the editors 
stopped differentiating infantry and 
commandos by emphasizing that the 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard, the commander of the Fusiliers 
Mont-Royal at Dieppe, was hailed in the press as one of the heros of the 
failed operation.
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soldiers “fell under the command of 
Combined Operations.”33 The most 
striking headline belonged to La 
Patrie: “The commandos left Dieppe 
in ruins.”34 The Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
soon shared in this glory; they were 
characterized as “commandos” as 
soon as their participation in the 
raid was announced. Canadian 
Press correspondent William Stewart 
maintained that they had been 
“trained” as such and he also claimed 
that he had accompanied them in 
their training.35 A similar claim can be 
traced to Le Canada: “the Fusiliers had 
long been trained in the tactics used 
by commandos” - and in Le Devoir 
which depicted the Fusiliers “as 
commandos from Quebec specially 
trained…for the historic raid on 
Dieppe.”36 The term “commando” 
disappeared from official accounts as 
early as 22 August, yet it continued 
to be used by newspapers. Editors 
continued to use “commando” in 
the captions accompanying pictures 
of soldiers at Dieppe, a sign that the 
term was firmly entrenched in the 
vocabulary of the raid. 
To “embellish” the carnage: 
the Heroic Phase 
During the “heroic phase,” the gap between a triumphant narrative 
and the lists of victims published 
daily by newspapers became more 
apparent. It explains the “uneasiness” 
J.L. Ralston, the minister of National 
Defence, attempted to dissipate 
with the release of a first official 
account of Jubilee. Meanwhile, 
the Army’s public relations unit 
continued to feed the press with 
stories from war correspondents 
and testimonies celebrating FMR 
soldiers. Both were heavily exploited 
by Quebec newspapers, no matter 
their political leaning. For example, 
Le Devoir printed a Canadian Press 
cable which gave the prominent role 
in the raid to the French Canadian 
unit: “The Fusiliers Mont-Royal and 
their comrades valiantly received 
their baptism of fire in combat. The 
level of violence was comparable to 
what their fathers had experimented 
during the Great War. They saw a 
number of their comrades fall under 
enemy fire, others collapse covered 
with wounds, and others captured 
by the Germans.”37 
The FMR were again portrayed 
as elite soldiers: “Because of their 
energy, combat skill and composure 
while going through preliminary 
exercises in England, those French 
Canadians were chosen for the 
operation against Dieppe, the first 
of a series of great operations aimed 
at preparing the invasion of the 
European continent.”38 A similar 
point of view, written by William 
Stewart, was published in La Presse. 
He stressed “the excellent conduct of 
our Fusiliers” in “the hell of Dieppe.”39 
Le Canada was equally hagiographical 
in emphasizing the central role 
played by the FMR as well as their 
enthusiasm for battle: “From the 
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8 John Grierson (left), chairman of the 
Wartime Information Board, meets 
with Ralph Foster, head of graphics, 
National Film Board of Canada, to 
examine a series of posters produced 
by the National Film Board of Canada. 
One of the posters produced in the 
Men of Valor series highlighted the 
actions of Lieutenant-Dollard Ménard 
at Dieppe. This poster can be seen in 
the background between the two men.
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start, they were assigned to a most 
difficult sector, one that required 
all their courage: German weapons 
fired on the landing beach, in front 
of the city; the Montrealers fought 
like all the others, with heroism, and 
returned to their base with many 
missing.”40
However ,  the  at tempts  to 
idealize the heroism ran headlong 
into the stark reality of the casualty 
figures. The constant reminders of 
the Canadians’ bravery in combat 
paralleled the various homages to 
the fallen – burials in England,41 and 
a religious service in Montreal.42 
During that period, two events, the 
release of a preliminary report on 
the raid43 and the conference held by 
Ross Munro, offered the opportunity 
to recapitulate and justify the raid,44 
ten days before the official tally 
of total losses was released, on 15 
September. From 21 August to 4 
September, official lists naming those 
killed were published almost daily 
by newspapers, sometimes several in 
one day, in the midst of enthusiastic 
articles hailing the performance of the 
Canadians at Dieppe.45
This  almost  schizophrenic 
representation of the raid was far 
less favourably received in the 
Anglophone press than by French 
Canadian newspapers. The Ottawa 
Journal lost patience: “Can we be 
expected to know the truth and act 
upon it if those who are leaders keep 
the facts from us and try to feed us 
on sugar-coated stories.”46 Two days 
later, the Globe and Mail was even 
more to the point: “Despite official 
protestations that the raid on Dieppe 
was a startling success, there is little 
evidence to justify that conclusion.”47 
No such criticisms can be found 
in the francophone press, proud as 
it was of “its” Fusiliers’ sacrifice. 
Could it be because the exploits of the 
famous regiment, no matter the cost 
paid, offset the insults against French 
Canadians for rejecting conscription? 
In the aftermath of the plebiscite, 
Quebec Premier Adélard Godbout 
had felt it necessary to explain in 
the legislature: “yesterday’s vote 
on the plebiscite, in the province of 
Quebec is not the refusal to make 
sacrifices for the defence of our 
country. We, French Canadians, 
are no less loyal than the others.” 
Hailed as icons, the Fusiliers were 
thus used to justify a controversial 
position and promote the advantages 
of voluntary service.48 In this context, 
the lists of fallen soldiers sanctified 
the francophone regiment and 
discouraged open criticism, even 
from Quebec nationalists. Le Canada 
avoided altogether the question – it 
only published the first casualty 
list, on 22 August, and thereafter 
focused on triumphant rhetoric and 
promoting national unity. The other 
francophone newspapers, including 
Le Devoir released the casualty lists 
but did not comment on the losses. 
Throughout the “heroic phase,” 
the newspapers differed only slightly 
in approach. Le Devoir explicitly 
emphasised “the names 
of French Canadians 
or Montrealers.”49 The 
editors clearly selected 
F r e n c h  C a n a d i a n 
surnames, regardless of 
where the person came 
from or whether they 
were officers or from 
the non-commissioned 
r a n k s .  O n l y  t h e n 
were the surnames 
of Anglophones from 
Montreal mentioned, 
and only  those  of 
officers. Meanwhile, 
L a  P r e s s e  f o c u s e d 
more on Montrealers, 
making no distinction 
in language. Unlike 
Le Devoir, the editor 
published photos of the 
casualties, including 
F r e n c h  C a n a d i a n s 
of all  ranks and in 
no particular order, 
but systematically presented the 
photographs of Anglophone officers. 
La Patrie followed the same approach, 
even though it had a lot less space to 
do so.50 
Whatever the approach, the result 
was the same - a disproportionate 
focus on francophone victims. That 
was not surprising since newspapers 
targeted francophone readers. Such 
over-representation helps explain 
the origin of the myth surrounding 
Dieppe; French Canadians were 
among those who had suffered 
the most. This was not necessarily 
the fault of the newspapers. The 
government’s own information 
services ,  by seeking to reach 
francophone audiences, may have 
contributed to this distorted view. 
Dependent upon official sources, 
and monitored as they were by the 
censorship, newspapers presented a 
stereotyped story, one that was not, 
in the end, very credible.
Ross Munro’s press conference 
in Montreal on 5 September, ten days 
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before the disastrous tally of casualties 
was revealed, likely strengthened the 
conviction that the French Canadian 
troops had suffered unduly heavy 
losses. The war correspondent 
traveled across Canada to discuss 
Dieppe and maintain the patriotic 
fervor.51 In effect, he adapted his story 
to the public in Montreal, making 
the Fusiliers the centre point of his 
narrative. He declared:
The flotilla that transported the 
Fusilier Mont-Royal was positioned 
at the centre [emphasis added] of the 
expedition…on its left, traveled the 
Royal Regiment of Toronto. A little 
ahead, there were the flotillas carrying 
the Essex Scottish of Windsor and the 
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. On 
the right, other craft carried the South 
Saskatchewan Regiment and the 
Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg.52
Compared to his first account, 
published in the aftermath of 19 
August,53 Munro’s 
s t o r y  w a s  m u c h 
toned down. Was it 
censorship? Bodies 
shredded by artillery 
had given way to 
heroes identif ied 
and made to seem 
i n v u l n e r a b l e .  I n 
front  of  a  crowd 
o f  8 , 0 0 0  p e o p l e , 
M u n r o  r i g h t l y 
hailed the heroism 
of the Fusiliers Mont-
Royal’s  chaplain, 
Capta in  Armand 
S a b o u r i n ,  a n d 
their commander, 
Lieutenant-Colonel 
Dollard Ménard.54 Munro presented 
an almost superhuman portrait of the 
FMR’s commander: 
Colonel Ménard had taken the lead 
and was ready to launch an assault 
on the enemy when he got hit while 
climbing over the seawall. Enemy fire 
was very heavy and originated from 
houses where they had taken shelter, 
but also from the cliffs overlooking 
the beach and the city. 
Despite his injuries, Colonel Ménard 
remained at his post and, with the 
help of his officers, kept directing his 
men. Mixed with the regiments from 
Toronto and Hamilton, they fought 
with courage and nerve for hours.55
Munro insisted: “nothing could 
have stopped the French Canadians 
– go forward was the order given 
and go forward it remained.” All the 
ingredients of an adventure story 
were there: a brave, young French 
Canadian officer who galvanized 
the courage of his troops despite 
overwhelming odds. Tailor-made 
for the French Canadian public, the 
remarks were in fact not truthful. The 
correspondent presented himself as 
an eyewitness to the exploits of the 
French Canadian regiment while, 
in fact, he had landed in Puys with 
the Royal Regiment, some three 
kilometres of the Fusiliers Mont-
Royal.56 How could he claim to have 
witnessed the French Canadians in 
action? In essence, Munro became a 
propagandist working on behalf of 
the war effort and his story mirrored 
the Army’s press releases. Some 
historians have since denounced such 
an approach.57
Revealing the losses: 
French Canadian sacrifice 
On 15  September  1942 the Canadian public learned what 
had long been feared - more than 
half the troops landed at Dieppe had 
been lost: a disaster. This did not 
stop La Presse from celebrating the 
operation: “Canada’s total losses at 
Dieppe reached 3,350 dead, wounded 
and missing. It, so far, one of our 
most glorious feats overseas” – even 
though the compiled casualty lists 
occupied two full pages.58 Le Devoir 
could not help but make an ironic 
comment: “Alas! There is no war 
without a cost.”59
Once the official tally was known, 
Canadian newspapers reacted 
differently and not necessarily 
according to their political affiliations. 
For example, John Collingwood Read 
from The Globe and Mail questioned 
the relevance of the operation and 
the competence of those in charge 
and argued that the benefits were 
not worth the cost. Other newspapers 
denounced the lack of transparency 
from military officials. The Liberal 
Regina Leader-Post lamented the 
excessive appeal to heroism at the 
expense of truth.60 The other Liberal 
dailies remained quiet on the issue 
or accepted the official version.61 
Three soldiers of the 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
aboard a transport 
ship taking them to 
England, April 1942.
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In Quebec, the same dynamic took 
place. La Presse’s editorialist took 
notice of the tally but insisted that it 
did not diminish the achievement: 
It is now very clear that the Canadian 
“commandos” accomplished their 
mission under circumstances where 
before the attack every detail had 
been considered, but the men did not 
know that the gains would come at 
a heavy cost. It did not matter! They 
were given a task to complete and 
they would accomplish it without 
considering the risks and dangers. 
They approached their task proud, 
brave and with an admirable attitude 
in the tradition of our Dominion’s 
officers and soldiers during the 
Great War. 
Then, using the official discourse he 
added: “Their sacrifice was not in 
vain: it will help us prepare for the 
day we can defeat the enemy and 
restore peace in the world.”62 
More surprising was the absence 
of immediate reaction from Le Devoir. 
The editorial of 15 September did not 
elaborate on the official numbers. 
Gérard Pelletier did not address 
the issue until the following week 
when Ralston presented his report. 
Even then, he reiterated the Globe 
and Mail’s “very sensible” question. 
How could it be that an operation 
that depended on the element of 
surprise was continued after German 
ships intercepted the Allied convoy? 
Ironically Le Devoir and the Toronto 
newspaper agreed on one thing: the 
responsibility of defence minister 
Ralston in an affair still wrapped in 
questions that was “very costly, with 
positive results that remained to be 
determined.”63 Only La Patrie was 
openly critical. Eustache Letellier de 
Saint-Just questioned the good faith 
of those who had sponsored the raid: 
Now the truth is known, we do not 
believe public opinion in Canada 
will be satisfied with the official 
explanation that the raid on Dieppe 
was instrumental in obtaining 
crucial information on the defensive 
organization of the enemy. If the 
expedition’s only goal was to survey 
coastal defences, one wonders why 
the same result could not have been 
achieved with a smaller deployment 
of troops.64
The concern expressed by this 
column, not to mention the discretion 
of the other Quebec newspapers, 
had a lot to do with the conscription 
crisis. For the underlying issue 
remained conscription. That could 
explain why in the beginning the 
Liberal press emphasized the role of 
French Canadians at Dieppe which 
so irritated many Conservative 
newspapers. Once the final cost was 
known, Liberal dailies appeared 
hesitant to openly criticize the 
operation, for fear of giving the 
debate over conscription a new 
impetus. Any wasteful usage of 
troops, as Dieppe proved to be, 
only fueled a conservative press 
eager to demand conscription. At 
that stage, it was less the failure of 
the raid that preoccupied Liberals 
than the way it was exploited for 
political reasons. To highlight the 
losses put greater pressure on the 
government to act. The editor of 
La Patrie thought it was cause for 
concern: “In the light of what we now 
know about the organisation of the 
Dieppe raid, it would be a profound 
mistake to invoke the losses the 
Canadian army sustained to stir up 
the agitation over conscription.” As 
for Le Soleil, its editorialist criticized 
the Tory press for pushing aside the 
real reasons behind the disaster and 
debating instead the benefits of future 
recruiting: 
In short, he wrote, the failure of 
these two operations [Hong Kong 
and Dieppe] have been costly for 
Canada, but it is certainly not the 
fault of Colonel Ralston [minister 
of National Defence] or [Prime 
Minister] Mackenzie King…They 
know full well that the political 
agitators are careful not to directly 
attack the federal cabinet. They 
do not blame him for the poor 
preparations or the sacrifice of so 
much vital energy, but they insist 
on finding out from the government 
what measures it will take to replace 
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Soldiers from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
wade ashore from a landing craft during 
a training exercise before the Dieppe 
Raid, 26 February 1942.
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two regiments lost in fifteen days 
[at Hong Kong] or the thousands of 
men sent to their death in five hours 
[at Dieppe].65
On 18 September 1942, Ralston 
got the last word when he released 
to the press the first official report 
on Jubilee.66 It proved increasingly 
difficult to hide the fact that the 
strategy behind the raid, except for 
a few minor successes - Varengeville 
and Pourville - failed. The details 
w e r e  d a m n i n g ,  e v e n  f o r  a n 
uninformed reader: the tanks were 
rapidly immobilized under enemy 
fire and reserve units were landed, in 
particular the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, 
despite the obvious traffic jam on the 
beach. In spite of the use of hyperbole 
such as the “magnificent support 
offered by the Royal Navy,” the 
report failed to convince the press of 
the value of the raid.67 
The first reaction came from The 
Globe and Mail which wondered why 
the operation was not postponed 
when the element of surprised was 
lost? The newspaper attributed 67 
percent of all losses to this mishap. 
In Le Devoir, Georges Pelletier was 
quick to chime in: “the ‘Globe and 
Mail’ of Toronto (19 September) is 
asking a question that makes great 
sense…No doubt Mr. Ralston might 
consider dispelling any confusion 
over a very costly affair, as positive 
results have yet to be determined.”68 
From then on, to give a favourable 
impetus to various Victory Bond 
campaigns, the focus was to be on 
the “exploitation” of Dieppe. The 
minister invoked the context of the 
war and remained vague on the 
“lessons of Dieppe”: “the value 
of the Dieppe expedition will be 
explained at a later time. For now, it 
is impossible to publicly analyze the 
lessons of the raid without offering 
information to the enemy.”69 
In early October, the awards 
ceremony conducted for the “heroes” 
of Dieppe ended the cycle of media 
coverage of Jubilee.70 As usual, Le 
Devoir emphasised French Canadians, 
pointing out that 27 of their soldiers 
had been “decorated for bravery” 
and “the FMR had the largest number 
[of decorated soldiers].” Two weeks 
later, a large rally held at Parc 
Lafontaine in honor of the “heroes” 
of Dieppe was aimed at promoting 
the sale of Victory Bonds. The 
announcement made all the dailies’ 
headlines, except for Le Devoir which 
published an account the following 
day on page three.71 The grand 
return of the heroes was carefully 
orchestrated. Louis Saint-Laurent, 
the minister of Justice, C.G. Power, 
minister of National Defence for Air, 
Adélard Godbout, the premier of 
Quebec, and Brigadier-General Panet 
presided over the event. The evening 
ceremony began with a procession 
and the singing of “O Canada” and 
ended with “God Save the King.” The 
government ordered that all radio 
A German photograph of a group of Canadian soliders captured at Dieppe. It is believed 
that these men are from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal based on their shoulder patches.
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stations broadcast the tribute. The 
climate of distrust did not stop French 
Canadians from attending the event 
in great numbers and applauding 
their “heroes.” According to Le 
Canada, a cheering crowd of 25,000 
people attended the ceremony.72 
More sober, Le Devoir confirmed that 
the crowds prevented many among 
the public from getting close enough 
to their idols. Kept at a distance, 
many had to resign themselves to 
listening to the speeches through 
speakers.73
The  ra l ly  o f fered  a  good 
opportunity to recapitulate the 
stereotyped account of the raid 
and launch the third Victory 
Bond campaign.74 The day of the 
ceremony, interviews with Dollard 
Ménard, Armand Sabourin and 
other veterans were published in 
La Presse. Ménard recalled the raid 
in strategic terms – “Dieppe was 
a necessary operation,” read the 
headline, whereas Father Sabourin 
praised the heroism of the Fusiliers 
– “Brave men! All of them were 
brave.”75 Ménard chose to stick to his 
soldiers’ performance: “Dieppe was a 
necessary raid where the Canadians 
were successful!” He hedged his 
comments, claiming that he only 
wished to share his impressions and 
what he had observed.76 However, 
the next day, his speech clearly took 
on a propagandistic tone:
Our arrangement complete, he 
declared, we had time to reflect 
on the night of 18 August. We 
thought of France, oppressed under 
German rule. We thought of women, 
desperate mothers, children deprived 
of food by the Nazis; we thought 
of the French who had become 
slaves; we thought that the price of 
capitulation is infinitely greater than 
the price of victory.
The lieutenant-colonel did not 
hesitate to reference the Great War and 
the battles that had inspired his men: 
Vimy, Courcelette, Passchendaele 
and Ypres: “We knew we could not 
be less brave than those who fought 
the other war.” He concluded his 
speech with an overt call to support 
the war effort by promoting the third 
Victory Bond campaign: 
Those over there who risk their lives 
for you have the right to count on 
your support at all times. Through 
your hard work and your money, 
you are the ones who come up 
with the weapons that will give us 
victory. Without those weapons, the 
most admirable heroes will remain 
powerless. I have learned today that 
the government is launching a third 
war loan. Allow me to ask you to be 
generous. Those who do not lend 
their lives must donate.77 
We do not know the impressions 
left by Ménard’s words on the French 
Canadian public, but we do know 
that the words of Father Sabourin 
scandalized the nationalist elite. 
Unlike Ménard, Sabourin was 
political. In numerous radio and 
newspapers interviews the FMR 
chaplain, repeatedly and bitterly 
targeted the anti-conscriptionists. 
“The ones who stood up were those 
who stormed Dieppe” and not those 
who oppose the war effort overseas, 
claimed Sabourin.78 Even though 
such strong words did not appear in 
Le Devoir, or any other newspaper, the 
whole affair shook up the Church’s 
hierarchy. In his memoirs, Lionel 
Groulx recalls that, at the time, 
the archdiocese of Montreal was 
“bombarded” with letters and calls 
of protest. In a letter to Archbishop 
Charbonneau,  Groulx himself 
complained about the incident: 
Our people accept when the clergy 
reminds them of their duty in 
wartime; they do not understand 
when priests become outspoken 
and provocative propagandists on 
behalf of the government’s war 
policy, especially when they preach 
mindless attachment to colonial ties 
and openly advocate for overseas 
conscription. In truth, is this really 
the role of a servant of the Church? 
And, what do we gain at aggravating, 
in so many ways, the emotions of our 
youths? 
According  to  Groulx ,  the 
archbishop promised to silence 
Sabourin, without much result as 
it turned out, as the higher clergy 
supported the Canadian government’s 
war policy.79 Commentary on the raid 
faded from the newspapers. 
Epilogue
Has the tragedy been forgotten for all that? In postwar Quebec, 
small reminders of the raid could be 
found in the press. However, it was 
not until the 1960s that the event 
reappeared in the collective memory 
of the province. A curious transition 
from one generation to the next 
appears to have taken place with the 
more progressive elements adopting 
the same criticisms the Conservatives 
had used to frame the outcome of the 
raid in the immediate aftermath. This 
evolution is obvious in the newspaper 
articles published following the 20th 
anniversary of Dieppe.80 As much 
as it was accommodating in 1942, 
La Presse, consistently expressed 
the painfulness of the memory. 
For over thirty years, La Presse 
journalist Pierre Vennat remained 
the most faithful guardian of that 
memory. Son of Lieutenant André 
Vennat, who was killed at Dieppe, 
the journalist, commemorated the 
raid and remembered his father in 
the columns of the daily newspaper 
of the rue Saint-Jacques. Writing 
on important anniversaries, Vennat 
combined individual and collective 
memory. Though the narrative of 
his articles remained consistent from 
one commemoration to another, it is 
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possible to discern over the years the 
growing revolt of a son against his 
father’s sacrifice. This personal revolt 
came to symbolize that of an entire 
generation against the oppression 
the previous generation had endured. 
A similar attitude towards the 
participation of French Canadians 
can be seen in a number of media, 
history textbooks and literature. In 
this regard, the statement in Le petit 
manuel d’histoire du Québec appears all 
the more significant:
[By saying no to the 1942 plebiscite 
on conscription] Quebecers refused 
to wear the uniform and be sent 
overseas to be used as English 
cannon fodder.
That feeling was confirmed on 19 
August with the Dieppe disaster. 
The British Chiefs of Staff want 
to find out whether the Germans 
are properly defending the French 
coastline. To verify the obvious, 
they sent 6,100 soldiers, four-fifths 
of those Canadians, to the French 
coast in 253 ships. The poor fellows 
fell upon a German convoy some 
three miles away from the coast 
and the massacre began. When 
they managed to land near Dieppe, 
German machine guns mowed 
them down like rabbits. After two 
hours [sic] of this bloody butchery, 
the Chiefs of Staff understood that 
the Germans defended the coastline 
well. Orders were given to evacuate. 
Of 4,963 Canadians, 2,752 [sic] were 
killed by the Germans. The colonized 
are always used as cannon fodder by 
those who colonize them.81
Claiming a circulation of 125,000 
copies at the end of the 1970s, this 
essay confirms the evolution of 
Quebec’s intellectual landscape of 
that period.
Conclusion
A newspaper analysis of the Dieppe raid offers an impressionistic, yet 
revealing image of French-Canadian 
public opinion. The examination 
confirms the theory of Henry and 
Tator that the content of the press 
can be reflective of the interaction 
of multiple schools of thought in a 
society.82 Despite censorship of the 
press, contrasting opinions which 
sometimes go beyond partisan lines 
are apparent. The majority of the 
Liberal francophone dailies very 
clearly supported the Canadian 
government’s war policy, though that 
did not prevent some editorialists 
from severely questioning the 
relevance of the raid. Le Devoir, against 
all odds, demonstrated a surprising 
sense of caution. Meanwhile, the 
Conservative Globe and Mail used the 
raid’s failure to criticize the Liberal 
government. On the other hand, Le 
Canada, regularly denounced those 
who criticized the raid. Overall, 
newspapers had little choice but to 
relay the information fed to them 
by the official press services. For 
obvious political reasons including 
the challenge of conscription, the 
information shared with French 
Canadians was grossly manipulated. 
The only francophone unit involved 
in Operation Jubilee was placed at the 
heart of the raid and those in charge 
of communications manufactured 
heroes in order to seduce susceptible 
readers. No doubt the intention 
was to stimulate volunteering for 
service and to erase accusations 
of cowardice born out of a nearly 
unanimous rejection of conscription 
in the province. The attempted 
manipulation of the story proved all 
the more clumsy when the almost 
daily releases of casualty lists were 
published alongside the triumphant 
discourse celebrating the “heroes of 
Dieppe.” Ironically, the relentless 
media coverage that focused on these 
heroes appears to have backfired. 
Once the full extent of the disaster 
was revealed in mid-September, 
French Canadians created a new 
story with the FMR as the main 
victims of the raid. The “Heroes 
of Dieppe” that were crafted by 
Combined Operations Headquarters 
played a central role in creating a 
potent symbol of colonial oppression 
which lingered for decades in French 
Canadian interpretations of the raid.
The study of the French Canadian 
collective memory of the Dieppe raid 
confirms a persistent resentment in 
Quebec. Contrary to English Canada, 
where emotions were channelled 
through detailed historical analysis, 
the raid did not inspire critical 
studies on the francophone side.83 
Instead the memory of the event 
was transmitted primarily through 
literature and textbooks.84 French 
Canadians never seriously debated 
Operation Jubilee. Two reasons can be 
surmised: the absence of institutions 
able to support the growth of the 
francophone military historiography 
and the difficulty of identifying with 
British military tradition which was 
perceived as foreign. For francophone 
Quebecers, the political aspects of the 
raid took precedence over military 
considerations. With the rise of 
Quebec nationalism in the 1960s, 
the event resurfaced and became 
a symbol of colonial oppression. 
The essence of that discourse can 
be summed up in a single sentence: 
Canadians, particularly French 
Canadians, were sacrificed in the 
name of British interests in a war 
that did not concern them. The 
details of the raid have faded, but 
the resentment that fuelled the myth 
remains strong. 
Notes
 1. On this subject, see the historiographical 
review: Béatrice Richard, “70 ans après, le 
raid de Dieppe revisité,” Revue historique 
des armées 266, 2012 <http://rha.revues.
org/index7427.html> (accessed 21 July 
2012).
 2. Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: 
Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1994, 1989); Peter 
J. Henshaw, “The Dieppe Raid: A Product 
of Misplaced Canadian Nationalism?,” 
Canadian Historical Review 77, no.2, (June 
1996), pp.250-266.
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/4
45
 3. Béatrice Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe. 
Radioscopie d’un mythe (Montréal, VLB 
éditeur, 2002).
 4. Timothy J. Balzer, Selling Disaster: How 
the Canadian Public was Informed of Dieppe 
(master’s thesis, University of Victoria, 
2004); Timothy J. Balzer, The Information 
Front: The Canadian Army, Public Relations 
and War News During the Second World War 
(Ph.D dissertation, University of Victoria, 
2009); Timothy J. Balzer, “‘In Case the 
Raid is Unsuccessful…’: Selling Dieppe 
to Canadians,” Canadian Historical Review 
87, no.3, (September 2006), pp.409-430.
 5. Paul Veyne, Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leur 
mythe? (Paris, Seuil, 1983).
 6. Claude Beauregard, Edwidge Munn 
and Béatrice Richard, “Portrait d’une 
division,” introduction à Wilfrid Sanders, 
Jack et Jacques, L’opinion publique au Canada 
pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale 
(Montréal, Comeau et Nadeau, 1996), 
pp.9-19
 7. Frances Henry and Carol Tator, Discourses 
of Domination: Racial Bias in the Canadian 
Engl ish  Language  Press  (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 2002).
 8. This article offers a detailed and updated 
version of these aspects which were 
previously discussed in chapter 3 of 
Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe.
 9.  Balzer, The Information Front, p.143.
10. William R. Young, “Le Canada français 
et l’information publique pendant la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale,” Bulletin 
d’histoire politique 3/4 (printemps/été 
1995), pp.227-241.
11. Le Devoir, 28 août 1942, p.1. 
12.  Balzer, The Information Front, p.156.
13. Ibid, pp.166-177.
14. On propaganda, see: William Robert 
Young, Making The Truth Graphic: The 
Canadian Government’s Home Front 
Information Structure and programmes 
During World War II (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of British Columbia, 1978); 
On censorship, see: Claude Beauregard, 
Guerre et censure, l’expérience des journaux, 
des militaires et de la population pendant 
la Deuxième guerre mondiale (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Université Laval, Québec, 
1995).
15. Young, Making The Truth Graphic, p.172. 
16. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), 
Mackenzie King Papers,  J4 series 
additional, vol.414, file 3990, n.p., 
Charles Vining, “Canadian publicity in 
U.S.A. Report to the Prime Minister,” 
10 July 1942, pp.2-7. Note that the 
Bureau of Public Information, created 
on 8 December 1939, was replaced 
in September 1942 by the Wartime 
Information Board, under the authority 
of the prime minister.
17. This incident was reported in Le Devoir, 
28 août 1942, p.1.
18. Jeannette et Guy Boulizon, Stanislas, un 
journal à deux voix (Montréal, Flammarion, 
1988), p.143. Interview with Jeannette 
and Guy Boulizon, 6 October 1995, 
Outremont.
19. Interview with François-Albert Angers, 
15 September 1995, HEC, Montréal.
20. Gérard Cachat, André Donneur, À la 
recherche de mes racines (Montréal, Lidec, 
1984), pp.577, 578.
21. Le Devoir, 19 août 1942, p.2, 3.
22. Georges Pelletier, Le Devoir, 19 août 1942, 
p.1.
23. Manchette, “Débarquement à Dieppe/
Le tiers de ‘expédition est formée de 
Canadiens/Des commandos anglais, 
des fantassins canadiens, des rangers 
américains, des Français, attaquent sur 60 
milles des côtes,” La Presse, 19 août 1942, 
p.1. 
24. Le Canada, 20 août 1942, p.2. 
25. Ibid.
26. Le Devoir, 20 août 1942, p.1.
27. Ibid., p.1; La Presse, 20 août 1942, p.21.
28. Gérard Pelletier, Le Devoir, 20 août 1942, 
p.1.
29. Gérard Pelletier, Le Devoir, 21 août 1942.
30. Le Canada, 21 août 1942, p.1.
31. La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.1.
32. La Patrie, 21 août 1942, p.5.
33. La Presse, 19 août 1942, p.1
34. La Patrie, 20 août 1942, p.1.
35. William Stewart, “La belle conduite de 
nos fusiliers,” La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.1.
36. “Les ‘Fusiliers Mont-Royal’ nous ont 
fait honneur à Dieppe,” Le Canada, 21 
août 1942, p.1; “L’exploit de Dieppe. Les 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal ont joué un rôle de 
premier plan,” Le Devoir, 21 août 1942, 
p.3.
37.  “L’exploit de Dieppe. Les Fusiliers Mont-
Royal ont joué un rôle de Premier plan,” 
Le Devoir, 21 août 1942, p.3.
38. Ibid., p.3.
39. William Stewart, “La belle conduite de 
nos Fusiliers,” La Presse, 21 août 1942, 
p.1; William Stewart, “Les Fusiliers Mont-
Royal ont bravé l’enfer,” La Presse, 22 août 
1942, p.11; “Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, 
héros canadiens français de l’épopée de 
Dieppe,” La Presse, p.45.
40. “Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal nous ont fait 
honneur à Dieppe,” Le Canada, 21 août 
1942, p.1.
41. The front page has a solemn photo of 
the burial of 11 Canadian soldiers killed 
“glorious Dieppe commando raid” 
at Brookwood Canadian Cemetery in 
England. La Presse, 25 août 1942, p.1.
42. La Presse, 2 septembre 1942, pp.3, 10; La 
Patrie, 2 septembre 1942, pp.3-4, Le Devoir, 
2 septembre 1942, p.3.
43. La Presse, 15 septembre 1942, pp.1, 9 ; 
La Patrie, 15 septembre 1942, p.3, 26 ; Le 
Devoir, 15 septembre 1942, p.3 
44. Coverage of the entire conference may 
be found in La Presse, 5 septembre 1942, 
p.53, La Patrie, pp.19-48-50; and extracts 
in Le Devoir, 5 septembre, p.9.
45. Le Devoir, 24 août 1942, pp.3, 10; 25 août 
1942, p.3; 26 août 1942, p.6; 27 août 1942, 
p.3; 28 août 1942, p.3; 29 août 1942, p.3; 
31 août 1942, p.3; 3 septembre 1942, p.4; 
8 septembre 1942, p.6. La Presse, 24 août 
1942, p.1; 25 août 1942, p.2; 26 août 1942, 
pp.2, 25; 27 août 1942, p.2; 29 août 1942, 
pp.30, 47; 31 août, p.25; 1 septembre 
1942, pp.1, 9; 2 septembre 1942, p.26; 4 
septembre 1942, p.2; 10 septembre 1942, 
p.30. La Patrie, 21 août 1942, pp.1, 3; 23 
août 1942, pp.1, 3, 46, 49; 24 août 1942, 
pp.3, 26; 25 août 1942, pp.3-4, 6; 26 août 
1942, pp.3, 26; 30 août 1942, pp.1, 26, 53; 
4 septembre 1942, p.7. Le Canada, 22 août 
1942, p.1.
46.  Ottawa Journal, 25 August 1942, p.10, cited 
in Balzer, The Information Front, p.159.
47. John Collingwood Read, “Dieppe’s 
lessons being Studied,” Globe and Mail, 
26 August 1942, p.3, cited by Timothy J. 
Balzer, p.159.
48. La Patrie, 29 avril 1942, p.4.
49. Le Devoir, 25 août, p.3.
50. Nickname often given to La Presse.
51. The advertisement stated: “M. Munro 
est revenu au Canada en aéroplane à la 
demande de la ‘Canadian Press’ afin de 
dire au peuple canadien comment ses 
soldats se sont comportés lors de cette 
attaque épique sur une forteresse de 
l’Axe,” Le Devoir, 4 novembre 1942, p.6.
52. Reported in Le Devoir et La Presse du 22 
août 1942.
53. “Vingt minutes sous un feu foudroyant,” 
La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.2. 
54. “Le raid de Dieppe/Causerie d’un 
journaliste qui en fut témoin - Le rôle des 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal - Résultats du raid,” 
Le Devoir, 5 septembre 1942, p.9. 
55. “Le raid de Dieppe/Causerie d’un 
journaliste qui en fut témoin - Le rôle des 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal - Résultats du raid,” 
Le Devoir, samedi 5 septembre 1942, p.9. 
56. The full text of Ross Munro’s conference 
may be found in La Presse, 5 septembre 
1942, p.39.
57. “Such an att i tude has important 
implications,” writes Claude Beauregard. 
Ross Munro “was one of the few 
correspondents to participate in the 
Dieppe Raid (19 August 1942). His 
first article on this operation gives the 
impression that the raid was a success. 
Yet he had to realize that it was a 
monumental disaster. But censorship 
was at work.” Beauregard, pp.182-183. 
Similarly, Bob Bowman of Radio Canada, 
also at Dieppe, reported that the raid was 
a success: “Without this experience, a 
second front would have been suicide.” 
LAC, fonds Bushnell, MG 30, E250, vol.1, 
dossier 17, Bob Bowman, “Canadians 
at Dieppe, an Eyewitness Account,” 20 
August 1942, cited by Beauregard, p.183.
58. Ibid., pp.2, 11.
59. Le Devoir 15 septembre 1942, p.1. 
60.  Balzer, The Information Front, p.163.
61. Ibid., pp.167-170.
62. La Presse, 16 septembre p.8.
63. Le Devoir, 21 septembre 1942, p.1.
64. “Les leçons de Dieppe,” La Patrie, 16 
septembre 1942, p.10.
65. Cited by Léopold Richer, Le Devoir, 29 
octobre 1942, p.10. 
66. Le Devoir, 18 septembre 1942, p.3; La 
Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.17; Le Canada, 
19 septembre 1942, p.3. 
67. Le Devoir, 18 septembre 1942, p.3; La 
Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.17.
68. Le Devoir, 19 septembre 1942, p.1.
69. La Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.18. 
13
: Dieppe The Making of a Myth
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
46
70. Le Devoir, 2 octobre 1942, pp.3, 6; La Presse, 
2 octobre 1942, p.15; Le Canada, 3 octobre 
1942, p.2.
71. La Presse, 15 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3, 19; 
La Patrie, 15 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3, 26; Le 
Canada, 16 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3.
72. Le Canada, 16 octobre 1942, p.14.
73. Le Devoir, 16 octobre 1942, p.3.
74. La Presse, 19 octobre 1942, p.14.
75. La Presse, 15 octobre 1942, p.1. 
76. Ibid., pp.1, 19.
77. Ibid., p.15.
78. Le Canada, 26 octobre 1942, p.12.
79. Lionel Groulx, Mes mémoires, tome 4 
(Fides, Montréal, 1974), pp.250-251. 
80. This resurgence is particularly evident at 
the unveiling of a monument to the FMR 
at Dieppe on 18 August 1962. Lieutenant-
Colonel Ménard, former commander of 
the regiment is at the forefront. This is 
the first major official commemoration 
of the raid that brought together more 
Beatrice Richard is an associate professor, 
chair of the department of Humanities 
and social sciences at the Royal Military 
College Saint-Jean, Quebec and affiliated 
to the History Department of Royal 
Military College of Canada, Ontario. 
She specializes in cultural studies of 
warfare with a specific interest in French 
Canadians’ attitude toward armed 
conflicts and military institutions. She 
was awarded the C.P. Stacey Prize 
2004 for her book La Mémoire de Dieppe: 
radioscopie d’un mythe (VLB éditeur, 2002) 
and the 2011 best article prize for her 
paper in The Journal of Canadian Historical 
Association: “Quelle guerre raconter? Le 
dilemme du légionnaire Paul Caron.” 
Personal website: http://www.cmrsj-
rmcsj.forces.gc.ca/cp-fs/brichard/pp-
pp-richard-eng.asp
than 400 veterans. The ceremony was also 
attended by the veterans affairs ministers 
of Canada and France. Le Devoir, 11 août 
1962, p.2.
81. Léandre Bergeron, Petit manuel d’histoire 
du Québec (Montréal, VLB Éditeur, 1979), 
p.198.
82. Henry and Tator.
83. The francophone studies of Dieppe are 
essentially the work of French (from 
France) authors: René Abaudret, Dieppe: 
le sacrifice des Canadiens, 19 août 1942 
(Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969); Claude-Paul 
Couture, Opération “Jubilee”: Dieppe, 19 
août 1942” (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 
1969); Jacques Mordal, Les Canadiens à 
Dieppe (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1962). 
To this list may be added the translation of 
the English book by Brereton Greenhous, 
Dieppe, Dieppe (Montréal, Art Global, 1992). 
84. On this topic, see: Richard, La mémoire de 
Dieppe, p.99-139.
14
Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/4
